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DANGER! BOMBS MAY BE PRESENT. CANNON V. GATES:
A JAMMED CANNON PREEMPTS CITIZEN SUIT
INDEFINITELY'
INTRODUCTION
Jesse Fox Cannon was a patriotic citizen who, during World War II,
leased property to the U.S. Army for just one dollar.2 Mr. Cannon pro-
vided the Army with key lands for testing chemical and biological wea-
ponry against Japanese caves and underground fortifications.3 In six
months, the Army dropped "3,000 rounds of ammunition and twenty-
three tons of chemical weapons" on his property.4 More than sixty years
later, the land continues to be littered with hazardous waste while the
Cannon family is left waiting for the Government to uphold its agree-
ment to return the property to "as good [of a] condition as it [was] on the
date of the government's entry' 5 in 1945.
Less than four years earlier, on December 7, 1941, the Japanese
Navy attacked Pearl Harbor, killing 2,433 American soldiers and civi-
lians.6 The next day, in an address to Congress and the American public,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared war on the Japanese Empire,
7marking the United States' entrance into the war.
As part of our nation's war strategy, the U.S. War Department in-
itiated weapons testing. In February 1942, President Roosevelt withdrew
126,700 acres of land in Tooele County, Utah, creating the Dugway
Proving Ground. 8 This facility immediately became the military's test
site for incendiary bombs, chemical weapons, and biological agents.9
1. Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. 2008).
2. Id. at 1330.
3. See ARCHIVE SEARCH REPORT, FINDINGS FOR YELLOW JACKET RANGES, TOOELE
COUNTY, UTAH § 1.2 (Nov. 1993), available at http://home.comcast.net/-dpgsurvivors/
YJRFUDSSite.htm; TECHNICAL STAFF, DUGWAY PROVING GROUND, TOOELE, UTAH,
MEMORANDUM REPORT: ATTACK AGAINST CAVE-TYPE FORTIFICATIONS 7 (Oct. 21, 1945) (to
Chief, Chemical Warfare Service; declassified by DOD Directive No. 5200.9 on Sept. 27, 1958),
available at http://www.dugway.net (follow "Yellow Jacket Ranges" hyperlink; then follow "Project
Sphinx" hyperlink).
4. Gates, 538 F.3d at 1330.
5. Id.
6. PETER JENNINGS & TODD BREWSTER, THE CENTURY 230 (1998).
7. See generally Our Heritage in Documents: FDR's "Day of Infamy" Speech: Crafting a
Call to Arms, PROLOGUE MAGAZINE, Winter 2001, at 284, 288, available at
http://www.archives.gov/publicationsprotogue/2001/winter/crafting-day-of-infamy-speech.htm
(noting that by the end of Dec. 8, 1941, Congress sent President Roosevelt a declaration of war).
8. Cannon v. United States, 338 F.3d 1183, 1184 (10th Cir. 2003); West Desert Test Center,
Dugway History, http://www.wdtc.army.mil/History.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). The Dugway
Proving Ground was officially activated on March 1, 1942. Id. "Open air testing of chemical agents
was performed at [the Dugway Proving Ground] until 1969, when all such activities were sus-
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By 1945, the Army initiated Project Sphinx, a testing program in
chemical and biological weapons designed to "explore means of battling
Japanese forces entrenched in caves in the Pacific Islands.'" Project
Sphinx tests were to determine "[t]he best material, either available or
under development, for reducing Japanese caves and underground forti-
fications .... 1
Mr. Cannon owned nearly 1,500 acres of mining land adjacent to
the Dugway Proving Ground. 12 There were 86.5 patented mining claims
on the land, 13 including the Yellow Jacket Mines, the Great Western
Mines, and Old Ironsides Mine.14 Because Project Sphinx was created to
test chemical weaponry against "cave type fortifications,,1 5 this land-
and its mines-was invaluable to the Army's mission.
On May 25, 1945, Mr. Cannon signed a "Construction, Survey &
Exploration Permit" with the U.S. War Department. 6 In exchange for
one dollar, Mr. Cannon agreed to a six-month lease, allowing the Army
to "enter onto his land 'in order to survey and carry out such other explo-
ratory work as may be necessary in connection with the property; to erect
buildings and any other type of improvement; and to perform construc-
tion work of any nature."' 7  At the end of the lease, the Government
agreed to "leave the property of the owner in as good [of a] condition as
it is on the date of the government's entry."
1 8
During this lease, the Army dropped twelve-thousand-pound "Fall
Boy" bombs, and "Tiny Tim" rockets.' 9 The Army used incendiary
weapons such as "aviation gasoline, butane, gasoline, Napalm, PT Jell,
and Napalm-gasoline mixtures, '20 and released chemical toxins, includ-
ing "the choking agent phosgene, the blood agent hydrogen cyanide, and
the blistering agent mustard.",2' By the time Mr. Cannon returned to his
pended." ARCHIVE SEARCH REPORT, supra note 3. The Dugway Proving Ground continues to test
chemical and biological warfare, as well as battlefield smokes and obscurants. West Desert Test
Center, http://www.wdtc.arny.mil/History.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
9. West Desert Test Center, supra note 8.
10. Cannon, 338 F.3d at 1184.
11. MEMORANDUM REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
12. Cannon, 338 F.3d at 1184.
13. Id.
14. ARCHIVE SEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at §§ 5.1, 6.1.1.
15. Id. at § 1.2; see also MEMORANDUM REPORT, supra note 3.
16. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. July 23, 2007)
(No. 07-4107). The brief refers to an agreement with the Department of Defense. The U.S. War
Department became part of the National Military Establishment on September 18, 1947, which was
renamed the Department of Defense on August 10, 1949.
17. Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d at 1330 (10th Cir. 2008).
18. Id.
19. Appellants' Opening Brief at 5, Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. July 23, 2007)
(No. 07-4107).
20. Id. at 6.
21. Cannon v. United States, 338 F.3d at 1185 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003).
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land in September, 1945, the Army had "used at least 3,000 rounds of
ammunition and twenty-three tons of chemical weapons .... 
22
Nearly five years later, Mr. Cannon was still waiting for the Army,
the Department of Defense ("DOD"), or anyone in the Government, to
return his land to its original condition.23 In the last of three claims filed
against the Government, Mr. Cannon asserted that chemical agents used
in his Yellow Jacket Mine remained in the workings of the mine and
"make it impossible for me to ever operate the mine again .... ,24 Dec-
ades after the war ended, The Cannon property-which provided vital
testing grounds for the war effort--continues to be overwhelmed with
25hazardous waste.
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 26 creating a
"mechanism for the prompt and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste
sites., 27 Six years later, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act ("SARA") 28 amended CERCLA, including adding a comprehensive
and critical revision: a provision for citizen suits. 29 Following SARA,
however, a citizen suit under CERCLA is restricted until all cleanup ac-
tions are complete.
30
In the 1990s, the DOD initiated a number of studies31 on the Yellow
Jacket Target Area,32 which includes the Cannons' land. These studies
marked the initial stages of a CERCLA cleanup of the Cannon proper-
ty,33 and triggered the ban on citizen suits34 until removal of the hazard-
ous material is complete.
Federal courts recognize the disparity between CERCLA's underly-
ing policy of prompt and efficient cleanup and the reality faced by fami-
lies such as the Cannons, who have waited decades for the government to
remediate their property. Responding to such concerns, the Seventh
22. Gates, 538 F.3d at 1330.
23. Id.
24. Cannon, 338 F.3d at 1185.
25. See generally Gates, 538 F.3d at 1330-31.
26. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 2009); Brian Patrick Murphy, CERCLA's Timing of
Review Provision: A Statutory Solution to the Problem of Irreparable Harm to Health and the
Environment, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 587, 587 (2000).
27. United States v. City and County of Denver, 100 F.3d 1509, 1511 (10th Cir. 1996).
28. Murphy, supra note 26, at 588.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2008).
30. Murphy, supra note 26, at 599.
31. Appellants' Opening Brief at 6-9, Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. July 23,
2007) (No. 07-4107).
32. Id. at 7 n.5 ("The Yellow Jacket Site or the Yellow Jacket Target Area is the name given
the FUDS area bombed by the DOD during Project Sphinx. It is named for the Yellow Jacket pa-
tented mining claim owned today by Margaret Louise Cannon.").
33. Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1334 (10th Cir. 2008).
34. See id. at 1336.
35. See generally Gates, 538 F.3d at 1336 ("We are sympathetic to the Cannons' frustration
with the long delays .... "); Frey v. EPA (Frey I1), 403 F.3d 828, 836 (7th Cir. 2005) ("We recog-
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Circuit, in Frey v. EPA ("Frey I/ '),36 determined that without "active
steps, 37 toward cleanup, CERCLA could not require such a prohibition
to citizen suits. 38 The court held that the government "cannot preclude
review by simply pointing to ongoing testing and investigation, with no
clear end in sight."
39
After more than sixty years, the Seventh Circuit's ruling gave the
Cannons hope that their request for injunctive relief 40-- compelling the
DOD to remediate their land-would be granted.
Unfortunately for the Cannons, the Tenth Circuit held otherwise.
Disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit held in Cannon
v. Gates that although the government was only monitoring, assessing,
and evaluating "the hazardous substances on the Cannons' land, '41 the
Cannons' suit was barred. Because of the Tenth Circuit's interpretation
of CERCLA's ban on citizen suits until remedial actions are "com-
plete, ' 2 the Cannons may need to wait an additional sixty years before
their property is restored to its pre-lease state.
Part I of this Comment begins by discussing the enactment of
CERCLA, pre- and post-SARA. Part II discusses the Seventh Circuit's
break from precedent in allowing citizen suits to proceed prior to com-
pletion of remediation. Part III addresses Cannon v. Gates in light of the
Seventh Circuit's ruling in Frey 11. Part IV discusses whether courts in
the future should allow citizen suits when there is no cleanup relief in
sight. Finally, this Comment concludes that the Tenth Circuit was justi-
fied in holding that during remediation and removal activities, CERCLA
is a complete bar to citizen suits.
I. CERCLA
A. Background of CERCLA
In the waning days of the Carter Administration, Congress enacted
CERCLA43 to provide an efficient, effective means for the cleanup of
abandoned hazardous waste sites.44 Prior to CERCLA's enactment in
nize that Congress intended for remedial action to be complete before permitting judicial review.
Congress did not, however, intend to extinguish judicial review altogether.") (citation omitted).
36. Frey 11, 403 F.3d at 828.
37. Id. at 834.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 835.
40. Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1336 (10th Cir. 2008).
41. Id. at 1334.
42. Id. at 1334-36.
43. Megan A. Jennings, Frey v. Environmental Protection Agency: A Small Step Toward
Preventing Irreparable Harm in CERCLA Actions, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 675, 677 (2006). See also
Murphy, supra note 26, at 593.
44. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 26, at 591. "There are 'two overriding goals of CERCLA:
(1) to clean up hazardous waste sites promptly and effectively; and (2) to ensure that those responsi-
1218 [Vol. 86:3
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1980, the public became outraged over sites such as the Love Canal, the
Valley of the Drums, and Times Beach.45 In response to this outrage,
Congress provided the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") au-
thority to implement CERCLA's cleanup policies while also creating a
funding mechanism for the cleanup.46
CERCLA creates a process that the EPA must follow in implement-
ing cleanup.41 Initially, an abandoned hazardous waste site is placed on
the EPA's National Priority List, which identifies the most serious
threats and thereby initiates the cleanup action.48 A Remedial Investiga-
tion and Feasibility Study ("RI/FS") evaluates options. 49 Then, the EPA
selects a remedial action plan ("RAP") and issues a report.50  At this
time, the public and other interested parties are able to provide comments
on the plan.51 After receiving and responding to such comments, the
EPA publishes a record of decision ("ROD"), and implements the plan.
There are two types of actions that fall under CERCLA: removal
and remedial.5 3 A removal action is a short-term action taken to reduce
risk in an urgent situation.54 A remedial action, on the other hand, is
either independent of, or in conjunction with, a removal action, and pro-
vides a permanent solution to hazardous risks.55 Ultimately, the action
must "attain a degree of cleanup.., at a minimum which assures protec-
tion of human health and the environment.,
56
CERCLA was drafted in a hurry,57 without the assistance of legisla-
tive counsel,58 and passed under a suspension of the rules with little floor
debate.59 Partly because of this haste, CERCLA contains inconsistencies
and absurdities that require interpretation by the courts.6
ble for the problem bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they
created."' Id. at 591 n.16.
45. Tom Kuhnle, The Rebirth of Common Law Actions for Addressing Hazardous Waste
Contamination, 15 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 187, 189 (1996).
46. Jennings, supra note 43, at 678.
47. id. at 678.
48. Id.
49. Id. (noting the Remedial Investigation "evaluate[s] the nature and extent of contamina-
tion" while the Feasibility Study "evaluate[s] costs and benefits associated with potential cleanup
methods"); Murphy, supra note 26, at 595.
50. Murphy, supra note 26, at 595-96.
51. Id. at 596.
52. Id.
53. Frey v. EPA (Frey I1), 403 F.3d 828, 835 (7th Cir. 2005).
54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(23), (24) (West 2009); Frey 11, 403 F.3d at 835; Jennings, supra note
43, at 678.
55. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(23), (24) (West 2009); Frey 1I, 403 F.3d at 835; Jennings, supra note
43, at 678.
56. Jennings, supra note 43, at 678 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 962 1(d) (2000)).
57. Murphy, supra note 26, at 593.
58. Id. at 594 n.31.
59. Id. at 593-94.
60. Id. at 594.
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B. Common Law Decisions Pre-SARA
Originally, CERCLA was silent on the issue of whether parties
could seek judicial review while remediation is ongoing.61 As a result,
the federal courts had to decide how to respond to claims by citizen
groups and potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") attempting to delay
62cleanup actions. While some courts held the constitutionality of
CERCLA could be challenged at any time, other courts maintained that
all challenges-statutory or constitutional-were barred during remedia-
tion.63 Ultimately, federal courts created a "'clean up first, litigate later'
doctrine" that interpreted Congress's intent to bar suit until remediation
is complete. 64
C. SARA: Legislative History and its Implications
In 1986, Congress addressed many of CERCLA's issues when it
enacted SARA.65 Most notably, Congress added a timing of review pro-
vision,66 codifying the "clean up first, litigate later" doctrine. 67 The tim-
ing of review provision, section 113(h),68 makes it clear that PRPs cannot
stall remediation actions in order to delay or avoid paying for cleanup
costs. 69 However, this timing of review provision also bars citizens from
access to judicial review when response actions--or a lack thereof-
could potentially exacerbate environmental hazards.7 °
Section 113(h) provides a broad rule barring judicial review, then
provides five exceptions to the rule. The pertinent part states:
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law other than
under section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship ju-
risdiction) or under State law which is applicable or relevant and ap-
propriate under section 9621 of this title (relating to cleanup stan-
dards) to review any challenges to removal or remedial action se-
lected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued
under section 9606(a) of this title, in any action except...
(4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizens
suits) alleging that the removal or remedial action taken under section
9604 of this title or secured under section 9606 of this title was in vi-
61. Jennings, supra note 43, at 679.
62. Id.
63. ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, The Validity of the Basic Legal Structure and the
Role of the Courts, in SUPERFUND L. & PROC. § 2:13 (2007).
64. Jennings, supra note 43, at 679.
65. See, e.g., id.
66. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(h) (West 2009).
67. Jennings, supra note 43, at 679.
68. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(h) (West 2009).




olation of any requirement of this chapter. Such an action may not be
brought with regard to a removal where a remedial action is to be un-
dertaken at the site.
7 1
While exception (4) appears to allow judicial review for citizen suits, the
timing restriction effectively bars such suits during remediation actions.72
In enacting SARA, Congress balanced potential harms to the envi-
ronment against the right to immediate access to the courts.73 Congress
determined that "the priority must be placed on cleaning up toxic waste
sites as quickly as possible, 74 and therefore created a ban on judicial
review until remediation actions are complete.75
The legislative record, however, shows conflicting opinions on the
part of SARA's proponents.76 Senator Tom Stafford stated, "It is crucial,
if it is at all possible, to maintain citizens' rights to challenge response
actions, or final cleanup plans, before such plans are implemented...
, Alternatively, Senator Strom Thurmond said, "Completion of all of
the work set out in a particular record of decision marks the first oppor-
tunity at which review of that portion of the response action can occur.9
78
Further, Representative Dan Glickman stated that "the conferees did not
intend to allow any plaintiff.., to stop a cleanup by what would undoub-
tedly be a prolonged legal battle. 79
The Joint Conference Committee Report summarizes the legislative
discussion:
In the new section [9613(h)] of the [statute], the phrase "removal or
remedial action taken" is not intended to preclude judicial review un-
til the total response action is finished if the response action proceeds
in distinct and separate stages. Rather, an action under section
[9659] would lie following completion of each distinct and separable
phase of the cleanup .... Any challenge under this provision to a
completed stage of a response action shall not interfere with those
stages of the response action which have not been completed.
80
Despite the citizen suit exception, federal courts have routinely
looked to the legislative history and plain language of the timing of re-
71. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(h) (West 2009).
72. Jennings, supra note 43, at 680.
73. Murphy, supra note 26, at 599-600.
74. Id. at 600.
75. Id. at 601.
76. Jennings, supra note 43, at 680.
77. Id. at 681-82 (quoting 132 CONG. REc. 28,429 (1986)).
78. Id. at 682 (quoting 132 CONG. REc. 28,441 (1986)).
79. Id. at 682 n.35 (quoting 132 CONG. REc. 29,736-37 (1986)).
80. Murphy, supra note 26, at 607 (quoting Joint Explanatory Statement of the Comm. of
Conference, H.Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 224).
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view provision when holding that they lack subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate such suits until after a cleanup action is complete.8
D. Federal Court Interpretations of CERCLA Following SARA
The plain language of section 113(h) permits citizen suits when the
"selected" action was "taken" and "was in violation. ' 2 This language is
critical. Congress' use of the past tense implies that once the removal or
remedial action is initiated, it must be complete before courts have juris-
diction to hear the claim. 83 Courts have consistently followed this rea-
soning.
1. McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry
84
The citizens group McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation
("MESS") filed suit against the Secretary of Defense alleging that "past
and present treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous wastes" at
McClellan Air Force Base violated various environmental laws.85 Since
the 1930s, McClellan had been using toxic materials while maintaining
86aircraft for the military. In 1979, McClellan began its first stages of
cleanup with a groundwater monitoring program.87 After CERCLA's
enactment in 1980 and the SARA amendments in 1986, McClellan mod-
ified its cleanup program.88 While the district court found that MESS's
suit lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of CERCLA's timing of
review provision, MESS argued that it was not challenging cleanup ef-
forts, but merely seeking compliance with existing laws.89
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's interpretation of
CERCLA's timing of review provision. The court stated, "Section
113(h) is clear and unequivocal. It amounts to a 'blunt withdrawal of
federal jurisdiction.,, 90 The court acknowledged that because of
CERCLA's mission to provide a quick response, judicial review was
unavailable during cleanup, and may even be delayed permanently. 91
The court summarized, "We must presume that Congress has already
balanced all concerns and 'concluded that the interest in removing the
hazard of toxic waste from Superfund sites' clearly outweighs the risk of
irreparable harm.,
92
81. TOPOL, supra note 63, § 2:13.
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(h) (West 2009); Jennings, supra note 43, at 680.
83. Jennings, supra note 43, at 680.
84. 47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1995).
85. Id. at 326-27.
86. Id. at 327.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 327-28.
90. Id. at 328 (quoting North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1991)).
91. id. at 329.
92. Id. (quoting Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1018-19 (3d Cir. 1991)).
1222 [Vol. 86:3
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2. Razore v. Tulalip Tribes of Washington93
Following the initiation of an RI/FS of a former landfill site operat-
ed by the plaintiffs and located on the Tulalip Indian Reservation, the
plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the Tribes' management of the site vi-
olated environmental laws.94 The plaintiffs argued that the RI/FS does
not constitute a remedial or removal action under CERCLA, so therefore
they should be allowed to proceed with their claim.
95
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, and upheld the district court's grant of
a motion to dismiss. 96 The court reasoned, "CERCLA defines a removal
action to include 'such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess,
and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances...
, An RI/FS, the court held, meets this definition.98
3. Clinton County Commissioners v. EPA99
The Clinton County Commissioners and a citizens group attempted
to block a trial bum and ultimate incineration of hazardous soils at a
chemical site in Pennsylvania.1°° The plaintiffs argued that the planned
incineration "would result in the emission into the air of dangerous
amounts of highly toxic chemicals that would contaminate the local air,
soil, and food chain . . . ."'0' The plaintiffs' allegations of "irreparable
harm to public health" fell on deaf ears at the district court level, where
the suit was dismissed for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
10 2
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court's reasoning that
"challenges to remedial action under CERCLA's response provision [are
available] only after the remedial action has been completed."'' 0 3 In af-
firming the district court, the Third Circuit relied on similar holdings of
other federal courts regarding barring suit during cleanup actions, even
when "impending irreparable harm is alleged.'1°4 This decision over-
ruled the Third Circuit's previous decision in United States v. Princeton
Gamma-Tech, Inc.,1°5 where the court "allow[ed] a challenge to an un-
93. 66 F.3d 236 (9th Cir. 1995).
94. Id. at 238.
95. Id. at 239.
96. Id. at 239, 241.
97. Id. at 239 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1994)).
98. Id.
99. 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
100. Id. at 1020.
101. Id. at 1021.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1022.
104. Id. at 1024-25 (citing Hanford Downwinders Coal., Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1484
(9th Cir. 1995); Ark. Peace Ctr. v. Ark. Dep't of Pollution Control & Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th
Cir. 1993); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095-96 (7th Cir. 1990); Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d
1548, 1557 (11 th Cir. 1989)).
105. 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994).
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The Clinton County court held that "Congress intended to preclude
all citizens' suits against EPA remedial actions under CERCLA until
such actions are complete, regardless of the harm that the actions might
allegedly cause."10 7  The court noted that the plaintiffs should have
voiced their concerns during the public notice and comment period in-
stead of trying to block the selected cleanup action. 0 8 The court stated,
"Congress made the policy choice to substitute elaborate pre-remediation




II. FREY V. EPA: CITIZEN SUITS NECESSARY FOR UNDETERMINED
REMEDIES
Breaking with precedent, the Seventh Circuit in Frey II made it
clear that the EPA and all other parties responsible for cleanup actions of
hazardous waste cannot hide behind the CERCLA curtain to avoid suit
during remediation." 0 While the Frey 11 court upheld the bar on certain
citizen suits, it opened the door where remediation actions have "no clear
end in sight."'
A. Frey II: Facts and Procedural History
In 1983, the United States brought a civil action against Viacom to
remediate Superfund sites near Bloomington, Indiana."2 The sites con-
tained polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"), among other toxins. 113 A
consent decree directed Viacom to "excavate fully ... and incinerate the
PCBs" at six sites. a14 Following citizen concern, the State Legislature
banned the incinerator's construction.1 5 When Viacom and the EPA
came to an impasse over alternate remedies, the district court appointed
"a special master 'to see that the aims of the consent decree are carried
out expeditiously and to resolve possible disputes between the par-
ties.""16
EPA and Viacom reached an agreement on PCB excavation meas-
ures, and Viacom further agreed to "investigate water treatment and se-
diment remediation solutions" at three of the sites: Neal's Landfill, Lem-
106. Jennings, supra note 43, at 682.
107. Clinton County Comm'rs, 116 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1997).
108. Id. at 1024. The court stated, "Congress clearly intended that such differences of opinion
be communicated directly to EPA during the pre-remediation public notice and comment period, not
expressed in court on the eve of the commencement of a selected remedy." Id.
109. Id. at 1025.
110. Frey v. EPA (Frey I1), 403 F.3d 828, 834-35 (7th Cir. 2005).
111. Id. at 835.
112. Id. at 830.
113. Id. at 829.





on Lane Landfill, and Bennett's Dump. 17 Pursuant to the EPA's ROD
for each of the sites, PCB removal was completed at each of the sites.'
1 8
However, in the ROD for both Neal's Landfill and Lemon Lane Landfill,
the EPA stipulated that "future remedial decisions will be made regard-
ing" water treatment measures." 9 At Bennett's Dump, the EPA discov-
ered PCBs continuing to leak into an adjacent creek.120 There, further
investigation was needed before a final decision on groundwater treat-
ment could be made.
12'
B. Frey I
Because water and sediment contamination was still at issue, Sarah
Frey and others ("Frey") brought suit in April, 2000 ("Frey F'), 122 alleg-
ing violations of state and federal law, 123 and challenging the selected
remediation plan as causing continued PCB releases to the air, ground-
water, and surface water.' 24 While the district court denied the motion
and dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 125 the
Seventh Circuit remanded the case for "further findings of 'jurisdiction-
al' fact."'
126
In evaluating subject matter jurisdiction, the court described three
interpretations of the word "complete" as it relates to a removal or re-
medial action under CERCLA. 127 Most restrictive was EPA's definition
that "complete" is when the planned remedial and removal procedures
are finished, and all subsequent monitoring is final. 128 Least restrictive
was Frey's argument that "complete" is reached as particular stages of
the plan are finished. 129 However, the court settled on a middle ground,
"between the active steps designed to clean up a site and later measures
designed to monitor success.'' 13° The court differentiated between active
remediation measures and monitoring, noting that such monitoring ef-
forts after cleanup should not allow responsible parties to bar judicial
review.
31
With this decision, the Frey I court remanded the case back to the
district court.1 32 On remand, the district court held that since investiga-
117. Id.
118. Id. at 831-32.
119. Id. at 831.
120. Id. at 832.
121. Id.
122. Frey v. EPA (Frey 1), 270 F.3d 1129, 1131 (7th Cir. 2001).
123. Id. at 1130.
124. Jennings, supra note 43, at 689.
125. Id.
126. Frey 1, 270 F.3d at 1133.
127. Id. at 1133-34.
128. Id. at 1133.
129. Jennings, supra note 43, at 690.
130. Frey 1, 270 F.3d at 134.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1135.
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tion of the contaminated groundwater was underway, Frey's citizen suit
was barred under § 113(h) of CERCLA.
133
C. Frey Gets a Day in Court
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's ruling in
favor of EPA's request for summary judgment. 134 No longer could the
EPA hide behind studies to protect itself from citizen suits.
135
In Frey II, the Seventh Circuit found that "selected" remedies for
each of the PCB sites were complete and that "no further remedies have
been 'selected' pursuant to federal regulations."'' 36 Although the EPA
argued that PCB excavation was only one step in the overall remediation
process, 137 the EPA failed to show a timeline for completion. 138  The
court asked EPA counsel "whether a reviewing court could invoke the
Administrative Procedures Act... to compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed, if EPA dragged its feet for dec-
ades."'139 The court commented that the EPA believes CERCLA's timing
of review provision shields it from suit "as long as [the EPA] has any
notion that it might, some day, take further unspecified action with re-
spect to a particular site."'14
The Frey M court maintained that responsible parties must provide a
reasonable target completion date, and present "some objective indicator
that allows for an external evaluation."' 14' While the court failed to de-
fine what actually constitutes a reasonable target completion date, a 100-
year plan, in the court's view, was unreasonable. 142 The court noted that
it is reasonable for EPA to study the sites before selecting a remediation
plan dealing with groundwater issues. 14 3 However, "EPA cannot prec-
lude review by simply pointing to ongoing testing and investigation, with
no clear end in sight."' 144 In assessing the EPA's action toward further
planning, the court found "only a desultory testing and investigation
process of indefinite duration."'
' 45
Because the EPA's "selected" remedy of removing the PCB "hot
spots" was complete,' 46 and because there were no further selected plans
133. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2000).
134. Frey v. EPA (Frey 1I), 403 F.3d 828, 836 (7th Cir. 2005).
135. Id. at 836.
136. Id. at 833.
137. Jennings, supra note 43, at 691.
138. Frey 1H, 403 F.3d at 834; Jennings, supra note 43, at 691.
139. Frey M1, 403 F.3d at 834 (referring to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)
(2000)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 835.
142. Jennings, supra note 43, at 692.
143. Frey 11, 403 F.3d at 834-35.
144. Id. at 835.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 833.
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for remediation, the court determined that the Frey parties should finally
get their day in court. 147 The Seventh Circuit stated, "We recognize that
Congress intended for remedial action to be complete before permitting
judicial review. Congress did not, however, intend to extinguish judicial
review altogether. After a very long wait, the citizens of Bloomington
are finally entitled to their day in court."'
148
III. CANNON V. GATES
When Mr. Cannon leased his property to the U.S. War Department
for one dollar in 1945, he likely had no idea that his family would still be
attempting to get the land back to its original condition more than sixty
years later. 149 Mr. Cannon provided the Army with key lands for testing
chemical and biological weaponry against Japanese caves and under-
ground fortifications during World War 11.150 In return, the Army left
Mr. Cannon with a lifetime of lawsuits15 1 as he and his family have at-
tempted to compel the Army to uphold its part of the agreement to leave
the property in "as good [of a] condition as it [was] on the date of the
government's entry.152
After decades of ignoring the contamination issues, the Government
finally took an interest in the lands at the Dugway Proving Ground and
the Cannon property in the late 1970s when it conducted a comprehen-
sive study of the Proving Ground. 153 It took another twenty years, how-
ever for the Government to release an engineering evaluation and cost
analysis ("EE/CA") draft report for the Army's Dugway Proving
Ground, and the Yellow Jacket Target Area, which encompass the Can-
non property t 54 The EE/CA indicated that the Cannon property was
highly contaminated, and estimated that full-scale removal of ordinance-
related debris and other hazardous materials would cost approximately
$12.3 million.
1 55
147. Id. at 836.
148. Id. (internal citations omitted).
149. Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1330 (10th Cir. 2008).
150. See ARCHIVE SEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at § 1.2; MEMORANDUM REPORT, supra
note 3, at 7.
151. These lawsuits include suits by Mr. Cannon against the government in 1945 and 1950,
Gates, 538 F.3d at 1330, and a suit by his grandchildren against the government in 2003, Cannon v.
United States, 338 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2003). The lawsuits are discussed in Section A of Part III of
this Comment.
152. Gates, 538 F.3d at 1330.
153. Cannon, 338 F.3d at 1185-86 (citing the U.S. Army Toxic & Hazardous Materials Agen-
cy, Report No. 140, INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT OF DUGWAY PROVING GROUND (1979)). "ITihe
Government conducted a comprehensive study of contaminated lands at the DPG. In 1979, the
Government issued a detailed report of its study. The report noted testing had occurred in the Yel-
low Jacket Area adjacent to DPG." Id.
154. Id. at 1187. The Yellow Jacket Ranges refer to the Cannon property, adjacent to the
Dugway Proving Ground. ARcHIVE SEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at § 6.1.1. They are named
such because of the Yellow Jacket Mines on the Cannon property, among others. Id
155. Cannon, 338 F.3d at 1188.
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While the Frey H court clearly stated that the government "cannot
preclude review by simply pointing to ongoing testing and investigation,
with no clear end in sight,"'' 56 the Tenth Circuit declined to follow this
reasoning when it stated the twenty-year-old draft study "constitute[s]
the Government's efforts thus far to 'monitor, assess, and evaluate' the
hazardous substances on the Cannons' land, and therefore qualif[ies] as
an ongoing removal action.'
157
A. Cannon Versus the Government: Six Decades of Litigation
When Mr. Cannon reentered his property in September, 1945, he
found "the entire area . . .covered with shell, rocket, and bomb frag-
ments." 158 In just six months, the Army's testing turned the Cannon
property into a graveyard of ammunition and toxic chemicals. 159 Al-
though Mr. Cannon had previously leased the patented mining claims on
his property to private individuals, he found that many of these mines
were inoperable because of the chemical weaponry left inside the
shafts.' 6°
Mr. Cannon successfully filed two administrative claims against the
Government in the Fall of 1945.61 In the first claim, he was awarded
$755.48 to "compensate him for cessation of mining operations 'due to
the use of toxic chemical agents and explosive munitions. ' ' 162 The Gov-
ernment further paid Mr. Cannon $2,064 on his second claim "for de-
struction of mine shaft timbering due to 'the use of toxic chemical
agents, incendiaries, and explosive munitions."'
' ' 63
In July, 1950, Mr. Cannon once again attempted to sue the Gov-
ernment. As part of the claim, Mr. Cannon stated:
I realize that when I accepted this $2064 payment from the Govern-
ment it constituted full satisfaction for the claim against the Govern-
ment for damages done to the Yellow Jacket Mine. However, I did
not believe at that time that the chemical agents used by the Army
would remain in the workings and make it impossible for me to ever
operate the mine again without some sort of decontamination of the
underground workings. . . . It is now five years since the Army
dropped their poison gas bombs on the mine and I am certain that
there is still a concentration of poison gas present in the mine that
would preclude its operation by anybody without some sort of decon-
tamination. I do not know if the gas is present in dangerous quanti-
ties or even if the odorous material present is a poison gas but I do
156. Frey v. EPA (Frey 11), 403 F.3d 828, 835 (7th Cir. 2005).
157. Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1334 (10th Cir. 2008).
158. Cannon, 338 F.3d at 1185 n.2.
159. See Gates, 538 F.3d at 1330.






know that the miners who have looked at the property with a view of
taking a lease have shied away when they learned of the Army's use
of the min..... I believe [ I that it would require about $5000 to put
the mine in condition to be worked on again."'
164
This third claim was denied.
65
In 1954, Mr. Cannon conveyed the property to his son, Dr. J. Floyd
Cannon, who, in 1957, conveyed a seventy-five percent interest to his
children, Mary Alice, Margaret Louise, Allan Robert, and Douglas F.
Cannon.166 Although Dr. Cannon asked the Dugway Proving Ground to
clean up the property on numerous occasions, 167 he never filed suit.1 68 At
Dr. Cannon's death in 1980, his children inherited the remainder of the
property.
169
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") initiated the EE/CA
170
and a geophysical survey of the Cannon property 17 1 by 1994. As part of
the EE/CA, the Corps interviewed Margaret Louise Cannon, who ex-
pressed distrust toward the Government and "stated private land owners
affected by the [Project Sphinx] testing were 'probably going to have to
hire an attorney."",172 Four years later, Margaret Louise and Allan Robert
Cannon filed an administrative claim with the Army for injury to their
mining interests, which was denied.1
73
On December 11, 1998, the Cannons filed a lawsuit against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") 74 for "not
less than $8 million.' 75 In a bench trial, the district court concluded that
the hazardous materials left by the Army's Project Sphinx testing created
a "continuing trespass and nuisance,"'' 7 6 and found for the Cannons.
They were then awarded $160,936.85 in damages. 177 On appeal, howev-





166. Id. at 1185-86.
167. Id. at 1187.
168. Id. at 1185.
169. Id. at 1186.
170. Id. at 1187.
171. Id. at 1186.
172. Id. at 1187.
173. Id. at 1188.
174. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
175. Cannon, 338 F.3d at 1188.
176. Id. at 1189.
177. Id. at 1189 n. 11. The award for $160,936.85 was based on a reduced estimated value in
property from $176.26 per acre to $25 per acre because of the ordinance on the property. Id. This
estimate was based on Margaret Louise and Allan Robert Cannon's seventy-five percent interest in
ownership of the property. Id.
178. Id. at 1194.
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Applying Utah law, the Tenth Circuit held that "Utah state courts
look solely to the act constituting the trespass [or nuisance], and not to
the harm resulting from the act."'179 The court explained that "[u]nder
Utah law, a continuous tort requires 'recurring tortuous ... conduct and
is not established by the continuation of harm caused by previous but
terminated tortuous ...conduct."' 180 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that
because the act of dropping ordnance and chemical weapons ended in
1945, there is not a "continuing trespass or nuisance under Utah law."
18'
Further, the court looked to the FTCA, which waives the United
States Government's immunity from suit for
civil actions on claims ... accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for
... loss of property... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act... occurred.
18 2
An FTCA claim limits the government's waiver of immunity, stating that
a "tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is
presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years
after such claim accrues ....,,83
While the district court overlooked the FTCA discussion in its rul-
ing for the Cannons, the Tenth Circuit focused on the statute of limita-
tions found within section 2401(b) of the FTCA. Pursuant to this two-
year limitation, the court held that the Cannons' claim lacked subject
matter jurisdiction.1l 4 The court reasoned that Margaret Louise Cannon
acknowledged that there was contamination on the property during her
1994 conversation with the Corps.1 85 All of the Cannon children knew
about the biological and chemical weaponry testing from conversations
with their father, Dr. Cannon, and had knowledge of his multiple re-
quests for remediation to the Dugway Proving Grounds.18 6 Further, in
1994, the Army held a public meeting and informed the community-
including the Cannons--of concerns with environmental contamina-
tion.
187
179. Id. at 1193 (quoting Breiggar Props., L.C., v. H.E. Davis & Sons, 52 P.3d 1133, 1135
(Utah 2002)) (internal quotations omitted).
180. Id. (quoting Breiggar, 52 P.3d at 1136).
181. Id. at 1194.
182. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000).
183. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000).
184. Cannon, 338 F.3d at 1192.





The court found it unreasonable that the Cannons waited until the
draft EE/CA report was released before filing a claim. 188 The court fur-
ther held that "[a] surface investigation of their mining property would
have revealed the likely extent of the Cannons' property damage long
before the Government's study did. ,1 89 The Tenth Circuit rejected the
idea that once the Cannons were aware of the contamination and its
cause, they "need not initiate a prompt inquiry."'190 The court concluded
that "the Cannons undoubtedly had notice of the general nature of their
injury and its cause no later than August 1994.
'191
Because the Cannons were aware of the hazardous materials on
their property but failed to file suit until the Government issued the draft
report, the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations barred their claim. 192
B. Cannon v. Gates: Facts and Procedural History
In November, 2005, the Cannons used a new approach in attempt-
ing to obtain relief: they sued the DOD under the Solid Waste Disposal
Act. 193 The Cannons "alleged that the United States was in violation of
federal and Utah regulations applicable to generators of hazardous
waste" 194 and "that the United States has contributed to conditions on
their property that endanger the Cannons, other individuals mining on the
property, and members of the general public who come onto the Can-
nons' property.' 95 However, the district court dismissed these claims,
citing CERCLA's timing of review provision.196 The district court rea-
soned that the Government had begun cleanup actions when it initiated
investigations regarding "whether clean up efforts were needed."
' 197
In 1993, an Archives Search Report stated that the Yellow Jacket
Target Area site was "potentially hazardous,"'198 and recommended addi-
tional investigation. 199 The report noted that under the SARA amend-
ments, a CERCLA response action is required whenever "imminent and
substantial endangerment is found at ... [a] facility or site that was under
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense and owned by, leased to, or
otherwise possessed by the United States at the time of actions leading to
188. Id. at 1192.
189. Id.
190. Id. (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118 (1979)).
191. Id.
192. See id. at 1190-92.
193. Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 2008). Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-81 (2006).
194. Gates, 538 F.3d at 1331 (supporting the Cannons' 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) claim).
195. Id. (supporting the Cannons' 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) claim).
196. Id. at 1331-32.
197. ld. at 1332.
198. ARCHIVE SEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at § 7.0.
199. Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. July 23, 2007)
(No. 07-4107).
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contamination.,, 200 Later that same year, the Corps conducted an inven-
tory project report, which initiated the CERCLA process by determining
that the area qualified as a Formerly Used Defense Site.20 1 This report
stated that the Army had "conducted tests using persistent and non-
persistent gases and flame type munitions" on the Cannon land.2°2
In July, 1994, the Corps requested access to the Cannon property to
"determine whether or not these lands have been impacted by unex-
ploded ordinance. 20 3 A press release announcing an August 1994 public
availability session stated that Project Sphinx testing included "toxic,
smoke, and flame agents in bombs, mortar and artillery shells, rockets,
and ...light case tanks. Gasoline, butane, the non-persistent agents
Phosgene, Hydrogen Cyanide, and Cyanogen Chloride, and the persistent
agent Mustard Gas were [also] used in the tests.,, 204 A fact sheet at the
public session read, "[I]t is highly probable that these mine areas are
contaminated with hazardous ordnance and explosive waste (OEW). It is
suspected that there is subsurface OEW throughout the area which may
come to the surface through erosion, frost heaving, intrusive work such
as digging, or recreational land use.',
20 5
In August 1996, the Corps issued its EE/CA draft report of the Yel-
low Jacket Target Area. 206 The draft report noted the prevalence of ha-
zardous materials on the Cannon property. 207 It concluded, 'The density
of the geophysical anomalies and ordinance-related debris, the presence
of UXO [unexploded ordinance] and UXO-related items on the surface,
and the presence of multiple spent ordinance items imply that a relatively
higher hazard exists .... ,,20 While the draft EE/CA estimated that a
full-scale removal could cost approximately $12.3 million,2° it has never
been finalized, and there has been no action to remediate the property.210
However, further studies have taken place. A draft addendum to the
Archive Search Report was issued in 2001, and a draft Site Inspection
Work Plan was released in 2006.211 Nonetheless, each study remains in
200. ARCHIVE SEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at § 1.1 (citation omitted).
201. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. July 23, 2007)
(No. 07-4107).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 7.
204. Cannon v. United States, 338 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1187-88.
208. Id. at 1188 (quoting United States Army Corps of Engineers Engineering and Support
Center, Draft: Formerly Used Defense Site Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis Report: Yellow
Jacket Ranges, Site No. J08UT109800, Tooele County, Utah (1996)).
209. Id.
210. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10, Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. July 23,
2007) (No. 07-4107).
211. Id. at 11.
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draft form, and the government has failed to provide a timeline or any
further indication of cleanup actions on the property.
212
In upholding the district court's decision to dismiss the Cannons'
claim, the Tenth Circuit addressed (1) whether a removal or remedial
action had been "selected" and (2) whether the Cannons' claims "chal-
213lenge" that action. The court first established that through CERCLA,
the Government is authorized to respond to hazardous releases, and the
substantial threat of such releases, with removal and remedial actions
that it "deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare of the
environment.,
214
Concluding that CERCLA's timing of review provision barred the
Cannons' suit, the Tenth Circuit recognized its split with the Seventh
Circuit, stating, "While we share the Seventh Circuit's concern regarding
open ended remedial and removal actions undertaken by the Govern-
ment, we conclude that the plain language of the statute mandates the
result we reach here. 2 15 The Tenth Circuit held that the draft studies
released by the Government constituted ongoing removal actions at the
Yellow Jacket Target Area, and therefore triggered the timing of review
provision.21 6 The court reasoned that once the Government had begun to
"monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazard-
ous substances,' '217 parties must wait until the action is complete beforeinitiating suit.
The court determined that the Cannons' suit was a "challenge" to
218the cleanup action. 2 8 Because the Cannons "requested injunctive relief
ordering remediation of their property," the court reasoned that this suit
would "undoubtedly interfere with the Government's ongoing removal
efforts., 219 Following the Tenth Circuit's decision, the Cannons continue
to wait for the start of a meaningful cleanup action on their property.
Meanwhile, the Government continues its decades-long process of moni-
toring and evaluating the parcel.
IV. ANALYSIS
With the Tenth Circuit's holding, the Cannons are required to
wait-perhaps another sixty years-for Mr. Cannon's lease agreement to
be upheld by the Government, and for the land to be restored. The Se-
venth Circuit clearly stated that the Government "must point to some
objective referent that commits it ... to an action or plan" in order to
212. See id.
213. Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1332-33 (10th Cir. 2008).
214. Id. at 1333 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2008)).
215. Id. at 1335 n.7.
216. Id. at 1334.
217. Id. (quoting Razore v. Tulalip Tribes of Wash., 66 F.3d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1995)).
218. Id. at 1335.
219. Id.
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preclude judicial review. 220 However, the Tenth Circuit determined that
although more than twenty years of government studies have passed
without identifiable cleanup measures, CERCLA's timing of review pro-
vision applies. 221 While the Cannon analysis follows precedent 222 and
the plain language of the statute, it provides no relief-or justice-for the
Cannons.
A. What the Frey II Court Tried to Accomplish
In stating that Congress never intended the timing of review provi-
sion to be "an open-ended prohibition on a citizen suit, '223 the Seventh
Circuit broke from post-SARA judgments that instilled an absolute ban
on such claims while removal or remedial actions are ongoing.224 The
Frey I court has been hailed as giving citizens "a new opportunity to
raise ... claims in the future.
225
Although federal courts have held that CERCLA's timing of review
provision appropriately restricts citizen suits "even if there is a possibili-
ty that plaintiffs' claims will never be heard in federal court, 226 the Frey
II court held in favor of the citizen when there is "no clear end in
sight."227 The Seventh Circuit recognized that by continuously studying
a hazardous environmental situation, responsible parties can postpone
judicial review indefinitely.228 The court called for transparency in
cleanup actions, and mandated that there be an objective measure of
some future date of completion.229
Unfortunately, the court failed to define the factors that led to its
conclusion and therefore failed to provide a clear roadmap for future
courts and future litigants.230 Because the Frey 11 court did not require
the EPA "to actually select additional remedial measures to gain protec-
tion from suit, or at a minimum, require EPA to specifically show that it
will select them,' 231 the Cannons, and similarly situated parties, only
have a vague outline to base their own claims on.
220. Frey v. EPA (Frey 1!), 403 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2005).
221. Gates, 538 F.3d at 1334-35.
222. See Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1027 (3d Cir. 1997); Razore v.
Tulalip Tribes of Wash., 66 F.3d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1995); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation
v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 328-29 (9th Cir. 1995).
223. Frey I1, 403 F.3d at 834.
224. See Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d at 1027; Razore v. Tulalip Tribes of
Wash., 66 F.3d at 239; McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d at 328-29.
225. Jennings, supra note 43, at 675.
226. Id. at 693 (quoting Hanford Downwinders Coal., v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1484 (9th Cir.
1995)).
227. Frey I1, 403 F.3d at 835.
228. Id. at 834.
229. Id.
230. See Jennings, supra note 43, at 693.
231. Id. at 695.
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B. Why Cannon v. Gates Failed to Follow Frey II
The Tenth Circuit sympathized with the Cannons' frustration in at-
tempting to compel remediation of their property,232 but determined that
the plain language of the statute mandated a jurisdictional bar on the
Cannons' claim.233 Instead of following the Frey H court's reasoning
that the Government cannot delay judicial review by conducting studies
indefinitely, the Tenth Circuit instead followed an interpretation of Con-
gressional intent underlying CERCLA.234
The court disagreed with the Cannons' reasoning that there must be
"a site inspection, an engineering evaluation and cost assessment report,
public comment, and a final decision based on the administrative record"
before a cleanup action is "selected. 235 While decades of draft studies
may strike some courts as a failure to select a remedy,236 the Tenth Cir-
cuit found the Cannons' argument too restrictive. 237 The Tenth Circuit
did find that because the Government had completed an initial assess-
ment of the property, determined that the property was contaminated, and
because the Government planned a future site inspection, CERCLA's
timing of review provision applied.238
Following reasoning from the Eight Circuit's assessment of what
constitutes a "challenge, ' 239 the Cannon court noted that challenges to
the studies and other efforts put into the decision-making process of se-
lecting the cleanup action can result in unwarranted delays. 40 The Tenth
Circuit read CERCLA provisions broadly, allowing a twenty-year-old
study to constitute a removal action.241 The court believed that the Gov-
ernment was moving toward a remediation action, and therefore denied
the Cannons an opportunity for judicial review until that action was
complete.
232. Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1336 (10th Cir. 2008).
233. Id. at 1335 n.7.
234. See generally id. at 1332 ("Congress enacted CERCLA to provide a mechanism for the
prompt and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste sites. CERCLA protects the execution of a
CERCLA plan during its pendency from lawsuits that might interfere with the expeditious cleanup
effort." (citations omitted)).
235. See Feds are Protected from Weapons-Test Suit, for Now, 29 No. 4 ANDREWS ENvTL.
LrrIG. REP. 5 (2008).
236. See Frey v. EPA (Frey I1), 403 F.3d 828, 835 (7th Cir. 2005).
237. See Contribution, Tenth Circuit: Bar on Pre-Enforcement Review Doesn't Require Selec-
tion of Removal Action, 23 BNA Toxics L. REP. 754 (2008).
238. Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, What Claims Fall Within Limitation Imposed by § 113(h)
of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42
U.S.C.A. § 9613(h)) on Judicial Review of Cases Arising Under CERCLA, 116 A.L.R. Fed. 69 § 3(b)
(originally published in 1993).
239. Gates, 538 F.3d at 1335 (citing Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 675 n.8
(8th Cir. 1998)).
240. Id. at 1336.
241. Id. at 1334.
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C. What Cannon v. Gates and Frey II Mean for CERCLA
In enacting the timing of review provision, Congress did not prevent
citizens from obtaining judicial review. Rather, judicial review must
wait for the completion of remediation actions. 42 Courts recognize that
section 113(h) "may in some cases delay judicial review ... permanent-
ly, 243 but believe that Congress has balanced this concern with the inter-
est of quickly and efficiently remediating hazardous waste sites.
244
The Frey II court did determine that in the interest of justice, a 100-
year plan for remediation would "obviously" be unreasonable.245 How-
ever, the Cannon court held that twenty years of evaluating a site with no
concrete timeframe for selecting a final remediation action was reasona-
ble.246 While Congress provided for a citizen suit at the end of the re-
mediation process, there is a danger that the Government may become
too complacent in its cleanup actions. 247 According to scholars, a leng-
thy process for site remediation may soon create an opportunity for citi-
zen suits.
248
While precedent shows that the Frey II court broke with tradition,
public policy shows that the court was correct.249 The facts of the case
establish that Frey's suit came at a time when a "selected" remedy was,
in fact, "complete," thereby meeting a requirement of CERCLA's timing
review provision. 250 However, because the EPA had ongoing studies
investigating future actions, the Frey facts are vaguely similar to the
Cannon facts.
In enacting the citizen suit provision, Congress clearly allowed citi-
zens to seek judicial review of CERCLA cleanup actions. Because of the
language of the statute, however, courts have interpreted this review to
be available only upon completion of the action. If Congress is interest-
ed in making citizen suits available prior to completion, Congress will
need to modify CERCLA. Courts, in the meantime, will likely continue
to interpret CERCLA's timing of review provision based on the plain
language of the statute.
CONCLUSION
The Cannons have had many opportunities to file suit against the
Government in order to compel remediation actions on their Tooele
242. TOPOL, supra note 63, at 46.
243. McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 329 (9th Cit. 1995).
244. Id.
245. Jennings, supra note 43, at 692.
246. Gates, 538 F.3d at 1334.
247. James Stewart, Agencies' Slow Remediation Process Frustrates Courts; If Site Cleanup
Takes Too Long, Courts Will Permit Citizen Suits, 181 N.J. L.J. 128 (2005).
248. Id.
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County, Utah property. Because they waited until the Government
showed concrete signs of initiating cleanup, they missed their opportuni-
ty to demand action under CERCLA, and they missed their opportunity
to recover damages under the FTCA. While the Tenth Circuit sympa-
thized with the plight of the Cannons, it was not obligated to follow the
Frey II court in holding that there must be a concrete indication of future
remediation once studies have begun. The Tenth Circuit correctly fol-
lowed the plain language of CERCLA when it denied the Cannon's chal-
lenge. Until Congress clarifies when citizens may bring suit, the Can-
nons-and many more-will likely be relegated to wait until remediation
actions are complete.
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